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Roger F. Cutler 
Attorney for Defendant 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH E. SOHM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
TNENDELL D. WINEGAR, dba UTAH 
ELECTRIC & HOTOR COHPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 14654 
This is an action by the appellant, Keith Sohm, to 
collect contingent legal fees. The respondent-Winegar 
asserted that he only agreed to pay a reasonable fee for 
services rendered and counterclaimed to recover excessive 
fees which were retained by attorney Sohm. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court, sitting without a jury, found that 
there was no contingent fee agreement; rather, the 
appellant-Sohm had been retained on an implied agreement, 
whereunder the respondent-Winegar would pay a reasonable 
fee. The Court found that the appellant-Sohm had in fact 
-1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been paid more than a reasonable fee and dismissed his 
complaint. The Lower Court, further, dismissed Mr. 
Winegar's counterclaim and ordered each party to bear its 
own costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondent, Wendell D. Winegar, 
seeks this Court to affirm the Lower Court's decision 
and to award him costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff-appellant has failed to state the 
facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party 
below. The facts when so viewed show the following: 
1. The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter "appellant-
Sohm"), is a licensed member of the Utah Bar and commenced 
doing legal work for the defendant-respondent, (hereinafter 
"respondent-Winegar"), in the 1960's. At that L.me he 
did work on the basis of a $25.00 per month retainer. 
(R-66). Subsequently, the appellant-Sohm changed the fee 
arrangement and began doing work on a basis of $25.00 per 
hour. 
hour. 
(R-67). This sum was later increased to $35.00 per 
(R-67; see Exhibit P-6). 
2. In mid 1972, the appellant-Sohm was working on an 
hourly basis. At approximately that time, he accepted a 
case involving Mr. Winegar known as the "All Grain" Matter. 
Hhen he undertook the case, appellant-Sohm did not discuss 
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his fee with Mr. Winegar, but assumed that he would 
be paid a reasonable fee. He testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) You didn't discuss your fee? 
"A. (~1r. Sohm) No I didn't. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) You just contemplated a 
reasonable fee of Mr. Winegar 
"A .. (Mr. Sohm) Very much so. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) You knew he had to pay the fee? 
.. A. (Mr . Sohm) Yes. 
"Q. (!1r. Cutler) ~1r. Winegar would have had the 
resources to pay any fee you charged him as 
long as it was reasonable? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) Yes. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) The outcome of this litigation 
didn't depend on whether you would or would 
not be paid? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) It didn't matter. I think he 
would have paid me ... " (T-69-70) 
After the suit was commenced, appellant-Sohrn wrote to 
Mr. Winegar and indicated he may be willing to take it on 
a contingent fee basis, if he received a $600.00 cash 
retainer. (T-70). Concerning this offer, Mr. Sohm testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) Well, Mr. Sohm, as of August 
21, 1972, by your own letter, you said you 
wanted a $600. retainer fee to be applied 
against the contingent arrangement, or you 
wanted to be paid on an hourly basis, isn't 
that correct? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) Right. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) Had you performed some work on 
-3-
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"A. 
this matter, assuming, as I understand your 
testimony, that at any rate you would be paid 
some reasonable fee? 
(Mr. Sohm) This is right." (T-71). 
The defendant-respondent never accepted the offer of a 
contingent fee and never tendered the $600.00 retainer fee 
requested by Mr. Sohm. (R-76). Rather, appellant-Sohm's 
first billing demanded payment based on the hours worked to 
that date. (See Statement of August 21, 1972 marked as 
Exhibit 3-P, R-72). In this statement, Mr. Winegar was 
billed for 18 hours of legal work at $25.00 per hour. 
(R-73). That billing was paid by Mr. ~-<inegar. (R-74). 
3, On December 21, 1972, Attorney Sohm obtained 
a summary judgment against All Grain Company, but a 
personal claim against a Mr. Lawrence C. Taylor was 
continued for trial. (See Exhibit 2-P). However, 
negotiations concerning payment of the account were 
apparently underway subsequent to the entry of the 
summary judgment, but prior to the trial of Mr. Taylor. 
On February 16, 1973, Attorney Sohm informed Mr. Winegar 
that there was a prospect of obtaining payment on account 
in installments of $1,000. Now that some payment appeared 
probable on the account, Attorney Sohm attempted to convert 
the heretofore hourly arrangement to a contingent one by 
unalaterally informing respondent-Winegar that he was going 
to figure his fees on a contingent basis. (Exhibit 8-D). 
4, The first payment on the All Grain case was made 
on February 24, 1973 and irregular payments were made through 
-4-
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August, 1973. Thereafter appellant-Sohm did little or 
nothing to collect the balance owed on the account. Mr. 
Winegar testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) Did you have to undertake future 
collections after this (February, 1973) payment? 
"A. (Mr. Winegar) Yes. I waited for a number of 
days or 2 or 3 weeks and I had heard nothing 
so I called Mr. Sohm to see if any money had 
been received, and he said, 'no.' 
And I says, have you done anything? And he 
says, 'I have been awful busy,' and he came 
back and says, 'I can't find your file.' 
And I said that time is very important to me 
and ask him what he was going to do to get 
this money. 
And he said, 'let me check it out.' 
And I didn't wait but got on the phone and 
started calling these people, and I found out 
they had no contact and I had to make thirty or 
forty phone calls on my time and efforts because I 
couldn't get Mr. Sohm to do it for me. (See 
Exhibit 15-D, showing records of long distance 
telephone calls and dates evidencing about thirty 
phone contacts). 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) Did you contact Mr. Sohm during this 
period to see if Mr. Sohm would pick up your 
laboring oar? 
"A. (Mr. Winegar) Yes. I was continually provoked 
because I couldn't get him to do anything. And 
he said, 'I will check into it,' and he would 
call All Grain.' And I said, 'I ain't going to 
wait. It seems to me you ought to be the attorney, 
Mr. Sohm, ... " (R-101, 102 and 103). 
The respondent-Winegar's records show that payment of $1,000. 
was received October 1, 1973 and $1,958. as full payment on 
a compromised settlement was received by Mr. Winegar on 
October 3, 1973. (See Exhibit 13-D; cf. Mr. Sohm's testimony 
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reported at Page 3 of appellant's brief). 
5. The plaintiff-appellant was unable to state the 
total work he had performed for Mr. Winegar at trial on the 
All Grain matter; however, he did prepare a complaint, 
make two (2) Court appearances on Motions and negotiate 
preliminary arrangements with opposing counsel concerning 
payment of the debt. (R-79). 
6. Appellant-Sohm thereafter billed ~tr. Winegar in 
a variety of ways, at times requesting a fourth and 
at other times requesting a third of the sums collected, 
including sums collected by Mr. Winegar's own efforts. 
(R-79, 80; cf. Exhibit 10-D). 
7. For services rendered Mr. Winegar, the appellant-
Sohm admitted he received a total of $2,000., excluding 
payments made on the Flint-Walling matter. (R-59). 
Respondent-Winegar's records indicate Mr. Sohm received 
$2,500. (Exhibit 13-D; R-106). 
8. In approximately 1962, appellant-Winegar requested 
that attorney Sohm file litigation concerning a Mr. Kurt 
P. Rothe. After filing the action, the case was dismissed 
because of the Deadman's Statute. Appellant-Sohm claims 
that the matter was taken as a contingency. (See Second 
Cause of Action, R-3). However, he inconsistently testi-
fied that he billed Mr. Winegar and was paid his billings. 
(R-3; cf. R-81). Concerning the Rothe case, Mr. Sohm 
testified: 
"No I billed him something, I thought I ought to 
have something for it." (R-82, 83). 
-6-
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9. On or about January 24, 1975, (approximately 13 
years later), the executor of the Kurt P. Rothe estate 
determined that approximately $1,780. was available to 
pay Mr. Winegar on a claim that he had filed against the 
estate. The executor was unable to locate Mr. Winegar 
from his location in Heber City, but noted that Attorney 
Sohm had previously represented him. Therefore, contact 
was made with Mr. Sohm in attempt to locate Mr. Winegar. 
(R-83). 
10. Mr. Sohm estimated he spent two or three hours 
in calls to Mr. Winegar and in obtaining the money from 
the executor of the estate. (R-85). However, no court 
appearance was required and no legal papers were drafted 
by Mr. Sohm. (R-87). Rather, the extent of Mr. Sohm's 
efforts involved telephone calls with an attorney represent-
ing the estate, contacting Mr. Winegar to inform him of 
the event and confirming his approval of the settlement 
with the executor. (R-88). 
11. Thereafter, the executor forwarded a check 
made payable to t1r. Winegar; however, Mr. Sohrn typed 
his own name on the check and demanded that he be given 
a 25% contingency before he would endorse it over to 
Mr. Winegar. (R-104). Respondent-Winegar refused to 
pay what he considered extortion and directly contacted 
the executor. (R-105). The executor cancelled his first 
check and issued another made payable to Mr. Winegar and 
forwarded the same directly to him. (R-105). 
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11. The appellant-Sohm demands a one-fourth con-
tingent fee and has billed the defendant the sum of 
$445.14. Respondent-Winegar never agreed to pay and 
never understood that appellant-Sohm expected one-fourth 
of the estate check, until after Mr. Sohm placed his own 
name on the check as a payee. (R-105). 
12. Appellant-Sohm asserts that $50. for two hours 
work is due on a case known as the "Flint-Walling" 
matter which was billed on an hourly rate. (R-3, 65, 66). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT-SOHM FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THE 
PARTIES CONTRACTED AND AGREED THAT MR. SOHM WOULD RECEIVE 
A CONTINGENT PERCENTAGE FEE OF ANY RECOVERY MADE ON BEHALF 
OF RESPONDENT-WINEGAR. 
As is clear from the pleadings of appellant-Sohm, he 
has alleged that he had an agreement with respondent-
Winegar to receive a 25% contingent fee of all recoveries 
made on two collection matters. The first known as the 
"All Grain" suit, involved a collection on an account 
receivable for merchandise and services delivered. The 
second known as the "Rothe Estate" involved another 
account payable situation. 
Interestingly, appellant-Sohm not only failed to prove 
the existence of such a contingency fee agreement, but (at 
least with regard to the All Grain suit) admitted that he 
had abandoned that claim and sought to recover on the basis 
of a reasonable charge for services rendered. His testi-
mony clearly stated that he took the All Grain matter on an 
-8-
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hourly basis; however, after collection became probable, 
he attempted to convince Mr. Winegar to substitute the 
hourly fee arrangement for a one-third contingency, with 
a $600. base retainer. That arrangement was never 
consummated by Mr. Sohm's own admission. He testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) After you tell him, (Mr. Winegar 
in a note on the bottom of a bill): 'I will 
pursue the matter on a contingent basis with a 
minimum as suggested in one of my previous letters,' 
did he (Mr. Winegar) agree to pay this? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) No, he did not agree to pay this." 
(R-76). 
In fact, Mr. Sohm testified that he understood he would 
be working on an hourly rate as a basis of determining a 
reasonable fee and not a contingent one. (See quote in 
Statement of Fact No. 2). Thereafter, during pointed cross-
examination he seemed to abandon his contingency fee claim 
and switch his legal theory to an argument that 25% of a 
collection was a reasonable fee. He stated: 
"My contention, of course, is that as far as 
the fee: one-fourth is a reasonable fee." (R-75). 
Therefore, although ~rr. Sohm's complaint alleged a contin-
gent fee agreement, his own testimony proved that the 
All Grain matter was taken on the basis of a reasonable fee. 
This fee was in turn based on the hours worked and payable 
at the rate of 525. per hour. 
Subseque:1tly, a:tJpellant-Schm did retain funds from 
pa7~e~ts ~ecei~,e~ ~hrough ~is o~~ice, equal to 25% of 
t::e ar.c~..:::t csllec~eC., ar.C 'Jr.. se?eral. sccasior.s billed 
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appellant-Sohm cleverly has quoted a portion of Mr. 
Winegar's testimony, which standing out of context 
would lead the Court to believe that Mr. ~vinegar did 
not object to this billing. However, Mr. Winegar's 
full response is as follows: 
"Q. (Mr. Sohrn) And you never did object to the fee 
I had put on those bills of one-fourth did you? 
"A. (Mr. Winegar) I don't believe that is a fair 
question. 
"Q. (Mr. Sohm) You never did? 
"A. (Mr. Winegar) Yes, I did. (R-109) (Emphasis added). 
Adrnitedly, billing and payment on some of those billings 
may be an indication concerning the agreement between the 
parties. However, Hr. Winegar's payment over objection 
and this suit itself, with its counterclaim to recover 
excessive fees, neuters any such inference. Thus, the 
record demonstrates that the Lower Court properly held that 
there was no agreement between the parties to pay Mr. Sohm 
a contingency fee. This Court in its own memorandum de-
cision stated: 
"It clearly appears to the Court from the 
evidence that there never was a meeting of the 
minds as to any agreement, contract, rate of pay, 
or otherwise as to attorney's fees, and that the 
plaintiff has been well compensated for the services 
rendered by him to the defendant, ... " (R- 4 8) (Em-
phasis added) . 
Appellant-Sohm has attempted to meet this finding by 
asserting the new legal theory of estoppel. (See page 7 
of appellant's brief). Appellant-Sohm's failure to cite 
any legal authority for this assertion is indicative of 
-10-
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its true legal merit. 
Promissory estoppel is an equitable principle, 
premised on detrimental reliance by one party because 
of the actions or failure to act on the part of another. 
Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 30. 
The appellant-Sohm has no pleadings asserting estoppel 
and has presented no fact to show detrimental reliance. 
The principle of estoppel simply does not apply to this 
case. Rather, this case is more correctly one of oral 
contract, with factual interests concerning offer, 
acceptance and the reasonability of charges. Certainly, 
such a case does not raise the issue of estoppel. 
Further, this Court has repeatedly held that it is 
not proper to assert a new theory for the first time on 
appeal. In holding that matters not raised in the 
pleadings nor put at issue in the trial cannot be con-
sidered for the first time on appeal, this Court 
succinctly stated: 
"Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is 
the final settlement of controversies, requires 
that a party must present his entire case and 
his theory or theories of recovery to the trial 
court; and having done so, he cannot change to 
some different theory and thus attempt to keep 
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation." 
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 
301,470 P.2d 399; see also, Nickle v. Guarascio, 
28 Utah 2d. 425, 503 P.2d 861 (1972). 
However, it is to be noted that the writer has no 
quarrel with the general points made in the citations of 
authority submitted by appellant-Sohm, which in substance 
state that a fee arrangement between a lawyer and a client 
-11-
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~ one of contract. The principles of contract do apply 
to such an agreement; however, the cannons of ethics 
regulating the conduct of lawyers throws significant 
light on how the court should construe fee arrangements. 
These cannons impose the following duties upon a lawyer: 
As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been 
employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear 
agreement with his client as to the basis of the 
fee charges to be made .... It is usually beneficial 
to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties 
regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. 
A lawyer should be mindful that many persons who 
desire to employ him have had little or no experience 
with fee charges of lawyers and, for this reason, he 
should explain fully to such persons the reasons for 
the particular fee arrangement he proposes. Cannon 
2-20 Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of 
Judicial Conduct. (Emphasis added) . 
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long 
been commonly accepted. However, again the cannons of 
ethics proscribes the lawyers conduct with regard to them. 
They provide: 
"Although a lawyer generally should decline 
to accept employment on a contingency basis by one 
who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is 
not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where 
justified by the particular circumstances of a case 
to enter into a contingency fee contract in a civil 
case with a client who, after being fully informed 
of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement. 
Cannon 2-20, Code of Professional Responsibility and 
Code of Judicial Conduct. (Emphasis added) . 
In the case before the Bar, the appellant-Sohm failed 
to meet these requirements. In fact, the proof submitted 
established that Mr. Winegar was able to pay a reasonable 
fee, contracted with appellant-Sohm to pay a reasonable fee 
based on an hourly charge of $25. per hour; further, he 
paid to Mr. Sohm a series of billings, the first of which 
-12-
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clearly stated he was being charged on an hourly basis. 
(See Statement of Facts number 2 through 7). 
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts of 
this case appellant-Sohm failed to prove the existence of 
a contingent fee arrangement and the Lower Court findings 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
Similarly, with regard to the Rothe matter, funda-
mental principles of contract law are particularly relevant. 
The Rothe matter was commenced and terminated in 
approximately 1962, almost 13 years prior to the case before 
the Bar. Appellant-Sohm testified that the Rothe case was 
undertaken on a contingent fee basis; however, the respondent-
Winegar could not recall specifically the fee arrangement 
which existed between him and Mr. Sohm in 1962. However, 
Mr. Winegar was certain that subsequent to the dismissal 
of that action because of the Deadman's Statute, he had 
received and paid a bill submitted by ~~. Sohm. 
On examination concerning this assertion, Mr. Sohm 
admitted that subsequent to the case's dismissal, he had 
billed for his services and had been paid. He stated: 
"I billed him something, I thought I ought 
to have something for it." (R-82-83). 
Apparently, Mr. l~inegar agreed, either because of their 
original understanding concerning fees or because he con-
sented to a novation of their original understanding. At 
any rate, the matter was the subject of an accord and 
satisfaction, quite apart from the fact (as alleged in 
Mr. Winegar's answer and counterclaim) the Statute of 
Limitations had long since lapsed on any claims by appellant-
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Sohm on this case. 
R-12). 
(See 78-12-36, Utah Code Ann., 1953; 
The testimony at trial was clear and unrebutted that 
there was no specific agreement between the parties that 
respondent-Winegar would pay a contingency of 25% for the 
amount collected on the Rothe Estate check which was 
tendered in 1975. In fact, there was no mention or discussion 
of any fee by Mr. Sohm; rather, it was reasonably assumed 
by Mr. Winegar that he would pay a reasonable fee for the 
time rendered by Mr. Sohm. 
through 12). 
(See Statement of Facts 8 
Nowhere in the record does Mr. Sohm even suggest that 
in 1975 he entered into any arrangement which remotely could 
be considered as an agreement to assist Mr. Winegar on a 
contingency basis, with reference to the Rothe Estate matter. 
Rather, his entire claim is based upon the alleged contin-
gent arrangement created some 13 years before, which by his 
own admission he had converted into a fixed fee arrangement 
and which fee had been fully satisfied in 1962. 
It is respectfully submitted that the law of Utah requires 
lawyers to establish clearly their fee arrangements with 
their clients. Particularly where contingent fee arrange-
ments are to be established, these arrangements should be 
explained clearly to the client and where possible, reduced 
to writing. Because of a vastly superior position of 
experience and knowledge, as recognized in the Cannons of 
Ethics, the doubt concerning fee arrangements should be 
resolved against the lawyer. 
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In the case before the Bar the evidence overwhelmingly 
shows that appellant-Sohm agreed to provide his services 
on an hourly basis, but after collection became certain, 
he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade respondent-Winegar 
to accept a percentage contingent fee. Having failed to 
perform his burden of proof, the Court should affirm the 
Lower Court's decision that there existed no contingent 
fee arrangement. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT-SOHM HAS RECEIVED A REASONABLE FEE FOR HIS 
SERVICES. 
Appellant-Sohm did not plead in the alternative that 
he should receive a reasonable fee for his service; however, 
the defendant, in his counterclaim, did assert that he had 
agreed to pay Mr. Sohm a reasonable attorney's fee. In 
this counterclaim, respondent-Winegar did allege that he 
had paid an excess of a reasonable fee and requested a 
judgment for the difference. 
Concerning the reasonability of charges, the Cannons 
of Professional Responsibility set the underlying framework 
concerning the determination of a reasonable and proper fee. 
These Cannons recognize that lawyers must be compensated 
for their services in order to preserve the integrity and 
independence of the profession. However, it states: 
"A lawyer should not charge more than a 
reasonable fee, for excessive costs of legal 
services would deter laymen from utilizing the 
legal system in protection of their rights. 
Furthermore, an excessive charge abuses the 
professional relationship between lawyer and 
client." (E.C. 2-17, Code of Professional 
Responsibility). 
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The Cannons further provide: 
"The determination of the reasonableness 
of a fee requires consideration of all relevant 
circumstances, including those stated in the 
disciplinary rules. The fees of a lawyer will 
vary according to many factors, including the 
time required, his experience, ability, reputation, 
the nature of the employment, the responsibility 
involved, and the results obtained." (E.C. 2-18, 
Code of Professional Responsibility). 
In the case before the Bar, appellant-Sohm cagily avoided 
all questions concerning the amount of time extended on the 
All Grain case, except the original 18 hour billing. (R-78). 
However, the Court record of the All Grain matter was 
before the Court and examined by the Judge. Further, Mr. 
Winegar described the work that was actually performed in 
that case in the following colloquy: 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) It is in the record, or in the 
Court that you have ten hours on it? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) I haven't added it up. I don't 
know the amount, and I suspect it is greatly 
over that. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) You prepared the complaint and 
made two court appearances and then you had some 
conversations with Mr. Winegar, said you weren't 
doing anything to collect the money for him, is 
that correct? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) No. I have had no conversations at 
all. I have collected the money and sent bills 
on it and sent him records of it. " (R-79) 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) After you obtained judgment what 
efforts did you make at collection? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) I contacted the attorney on numerous 
instances, but mainly I kept the record of what 
was received and submitted back to them the 
interest, principle and the balance, and then 
received payments apparently in February, March, 
April and June. They skipped a month." (R-80). 
With reference to the Rothe Estate matter, the only testi-
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mony concerning the work performed came from cross-examin-
ation of Mr. Sohm. He testified that during 1975 he had 
a couple of telephone conversations with representatives 
of the Rothe Estate and conferences with Mr. Winegar. He 
testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) vlho did you have to call? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) I called Mr. Winegar a couple of times 
and the attorney a couple of times, yes. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) Was he in Heber City? 
"A. (Mr.Sohm) I phoned and used my own phone to talk 
to him to find out what it was all about and the 
necessary information. 
"Q. (Mr. Cutler) Would it have been under a couple 
or three hours? 
"A. (Mr. Sohm) At least that." (R-85). 
Mr. Sohm then testified at that time he was billing at the 
rate of $25. per hour to Mr. Winegar and stated: 
"At that time I was billing $25. per hour 
toMr. Winegar, ... " (R-85). 
With reference to the Flint-Walling dispute, Mr. Sohm 
testified that he was entitled to two hours work at the rate 
of $25. per hour; he stated: 
" ... the last bill that amounted to two hours 
was billed at $25. per hour." (R-65; Exhibit 6-P). 
Thus, giving Mr. Sohm the benefit of the doubt, there were 
approximately 35 hours of legal work performed. At the rate 
of $25. per hour it would have generated a charge of $875. 
However, on the contrary, the plaintiff was paid by his own 
admission $2,000.00, butthe sum of $2,500.00 if Mr. Winegar's 
testimony is believed. (See Statement of Fact 7). 
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Regarding the facts before the Lower Court, it 
specifically found: 
"1 .... regarding the matters of issue before 
the Court, there never was a meeting of the minds 
to an agreement concerning the payment of attorney's 
fees. Defendant did impliedly agree to pay a 
reasonable fee for services rendered on the cases 
subject of the within litigation. 
"2. The plaintiff (Mr. Sohm) has been fully 
paid a reasonable attorney's fee by the defendant 
(Mr. Winegar) for all services rendered to the date 
of the termination of their relationship and, in 
particular, on all matters subject to the within 
litigation." (R-49). 
The law in Utah, concerning appeals of contested 
issues of fact, is so clear as to hardly require recitation: 
Facts found by the lower Court will be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the prevailing party. Further, judgments 
will be sustained on appeal if they are supported by any 
substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. The burden of overcoming the presumption of 
the validity is upon the challenger. Tazlor v. Johnson, 
15 Utah 2d. 343, 393 P.2d. 382 (1964); Powers v. Taylor, 
14 Utah 2d. 152, 379 P. 2d. 380 (1963); Gordon v. Provo, 
15 Utah 2d. 287, 391 P.2d. 4 30 (1964) . 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the appellant-Shorn 
has chosen to quarrel with the findings sometimes on dis-
puted issues of fact and on other occasions against his 
own admissions of record. Appe11ant-Sohm refused even 
under cross-examination to state with specificity the work 
which he had performed on behalf of Mr. Winegar or the 
hours worked. Rather, he attempted to proceed on the basis 
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of a contingency fee arrangement, dispite his own 
admissions to the contrary. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court 
attempted to give appellant-Sohm the benefit of the doubt 
on the reasonability of the fee received by failing to award 
a judgment to Mr. Winegar on his counterclaim for excessive 
fees paid. However, it is respectfully submitted that the 
findings of the Lower Court concerning the reasonability of 
the moneys received by Mr. Winegar should not be disturbed. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should affirm 
the decision of the Lower Court in all particulars and 
dismiss the appeal, with costs awarded to respondent-Winegar. 
CONCLUSION 
To minimize unnecessary appeals, it is incumbent upon 
appellants to view the facts in a light most favorable to 
the prevailing party below. The appellant-Sohm has failed 
to so view the facts. 
The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party demonstrate that there was an explicit 
agreement whereunder respondent-Winegar agreed to pay a 
reasonable fee for sundry services rendered by attorney-Sohm. 
Mr. Winegar paid approximately $2,500.00 in fees. In 
return he received legal services on two uncomplicated debt 
collection matters. A third case merely involved directing 
the executor of an estate to the right address of the 
defendant and acting as a middleman in presenting an offer 
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of settlement on behalf of the estate. A fourth merely 
represented two hours of work, billed at $25. per hour. 
The Lower Court finding that the moneys received were 
more than a reasonable fee is adequately demonstrated 
in the record and should be affirmed by the Court. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER, 
Attorney for respondent-
Wen D. Winegar 
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